Abstract-An aggregate signature is a useful digital signature that supports aggregation: Given n signatures on n distinct messages from n distinct users, aggregate signature scheme is possible to aggregate all these signature into a single short signature. This single signature, along with the n original messages will convince any verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages respectively (i.e., for 1 … i = , ,n user i signed message i m ). In this paper, we propose an identity based aggregate signature scheme which requires constant pairing operations in the verification and the size of aggregate signature is independent of the number of signers. We prove that the proposed signature scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message and identity attack in the random oracle model assuming the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Shamir [1] brought forward the concept of Identity-based (from now on, ID-based) Cryptography as an alternative to traditional public key cryptography, based on infrastructures(PKI). In PKI-based cryptography, a certification authority must sign a digital certificate which links the identity of the user and his public key. Obviously, the management of digital certificates decreases the efficiency of practical implementations of public key cryptosystems. The idea of ID-based cryptography is that the public key of any user directly infers from his identity (e-mail address, telephone number, etc.). In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [2] proposed an secure and practical ID-based encryption scheme based on bilinear maps on an elliptic curve. Since then, several ID-based encryption and signature schemes have been proposed based on bilinear maps [3, 4, 5, 6] .
Many real-world applications involve signatures on many different messages generated by many different users. There are some efficiency problems (includes both communication and computation efficiency) of applications in which one entity has to verify many signatures simultaneously. For example, in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) of depth n , each user is given a chain of n certificates. The chain contains n signatures by n Certificate Authorities (CAs) on n distinct certificates. Similarly, in the Secure BGP protocol (SBGP) [7] each router receives a list of n signatures attesting to a certain path of length n in the network. A router signs its own segment in the path and forwards the resulting list of 1 n + signatures to the next router. As a result, the number of signatures in routing messages is linear in the length of the path. Both applications would benefit from a method for compressing the list of signatures on distinct messages issued by distinct parties.
An aggregate signature scheme enables us to achieve precisely this type of compression. In 2003, Bone et al. [8] introduced the concept of aggregate signatures and proposed the first aggregate signature (BGLS, based on BLS [8] short signature scheme) in which many signatures on different messages computed by different users can be aggregated into a single signature. In this scheme, while compressing n signatures into one, it could compress only a half of signature. Ideally, the length of the aggregate signature (excluding the messages and the public keys of the signers) should be constant, independent of the number of signed messages. This concept is very useful in situations where a device must store many signatures, for example routing protocols in wireless networks requiring authentication.
Since aggregate signature was presented, several schemes have been proposed so far, e.g. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .and the aggregate signatures are used in several fields such as contract signing, cascaded authorization, key agreement and wireless routing protocols, etc [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In 2004, Lysyanskaya et al. [10] proposed a sequential signature aggregation, in which aggregation can only be done during the signing process. In 2006, Okstrovsky et al. [12] proposed a sequential aggregate signature without random oracles. However, its public key parameters are linear with the length of the messages signed, thus, it is not practice in fact.
There are two types of aggregate signatures according to the signature aggregation techniques.
-General aggregate signatures [8] . In a general signature aggregation scheme each user i signs her message i M to obtain a signature i σ . Then anyone can use a public aggregation algorithm to take all n signatures 1 σ , . . . , n σ and compress them into a single signature σ .
-Sequential aggregate signatures [10] . In a sequential aggregation scheme, signature aggregation can only be done during the signing process. Each signer in turn sequentially adds her signature to the current aggregate. Thus, there is an explicit order imposed on the aggregate signature and the signers must communicate with each other during the aggregation process.
In 2004, Cheon et al. [22] presented the first ID-based aggregate signature (IBAS). In 2005, Xu [23] defined a security model and proposed an ID-based aggregate signature and proof of its security under the assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH-problem) in the random oracle model.
In 2006, Herranz [24] proposed a deterministic ID-based signature for partial aggregation, which just allows aggregation when the signatures to be aggregated come all from the same signer. Gentry and Ramzan [25] presented the most efficient IDbased aggregate scheme which requires only three pairing computations (independent of the number of signers). In this scheme all the signers participating in aggregation have to agree upon a common randomness value which makes it unsuitable for most real life scenarios. In 2008, Wang et al. in [26] proposed a practical aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing operation but was able to achieve only partial aggregation. A valid user of the system will be able to forge a signature on any message by any user by just seeing a single signature on some message by the corresponding user.
In this paper, We give a formal definition of ID-based aggregate signatures and its security model. We then propose a new aggregate signature scheme, which requires only three pairing operations in verification (independent of the number of signers). Furthermore, our scheme's security can be proved tightly related to CDHproblem in the random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section Ⅱ we introduce preliminaries and the computational assumption which we take into considerations. In Section Ⅲ we first give the security model for our aggregation signature, then propose an IDbased aggregate signature scheme and formally analyze its security and efficiency. And in Section IV we post the conclusions and the current open problems in this area.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let G and 1 G be two cyclic groups of the same large prime q . G is a cyclic additive group and 1 G is a cyclic multiplicative group. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both G and 1 G are hard.
A. Bilinear Pairing Definition 1. (Bilinear Pairing)A bilinear pairing is a computable bilinear map between two groups
. It is the modified Weil pairing or Tate pairing which has the following properties:
, ab e aP bQ e P Q = .
-Non-degeneracy There exists ,
e P Q ≠ .
-Computablity ( )
, e P Q can be efficiently computed for all , P Q ∈ G . 
B. Gap Diffie-Hellman(GDH) Groups
The probability is taken over the choice of a, b and A 's coin tosses. An algorithm A is said ( , ) t ε -breaks the CDH problem on G if A runs in time at most t , and CDH Adv A is at least ε .
Definition 5. A group G is a ( , ) t ε -gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group if the DDH problem in G can be efficiently computable and there exists no algorithm ( , ) t ε -breaks CDH in G .
If we have an admissible bilinear pairing ê in G , we can solve the DDH problem in G efficiently as follows:
e aP bP e P cP = . Hence an elliptic curve becomes an instance of a GDH group if the Weil (or the Tate) pairing is efficiently computable and the CDH is sufficiently hard on the curve.
Definition 6. Two order group
G G is a ( , , ) e t ε -gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups if there exists an admissible bilinear pairing
,but there exists no algorithm ( , )
t ε -breaks CDH in G .
III. ID-BASED AGGREGATE SIGNATURE
We define ID-based aggregate signatures and describe the security model for ID-based aggregate signatures which defined in [23] .
A. Definition of IBAS
Consider a set U of users. Each user u ∈ U has an unique identity u ID , and his correspond signing key pair is ( u ID , u sk ). We wish to aggregate the signatures of
produces a signature i σ on a message i m of her choice. These signatures are then combined into a single aggregate σ by an aggregating party. The aggregating party, who can be different from and untrusted by the users in U , has access to the users' identity, to the messages, and to the signatures on them, but not to any private keys. This aggregate has the property that a verifier given σ along with the identities of the parties involved and their respective messages is convinced that each user signed her respective message.
An ID-based aggregate signature scheme usually comprises six algorithms:
-G :takes a security parameter k and returns params (system parameters) and master key msk . The system parameters will be publicly known, while the master-key will be known only to the "Private Key Generator" (PKG) . 
B. Security model of IBAS
Here describes a security model for aggregate signature in [23] . In this aggregate model, the adversary F is given a single ID . His goal is the existential forgery of an aggregate signature. An aggregate forger is allowed to choose all identities except the challenge ID . The aggregate forger is also given access to a signing oracle with respect to the challenge ID . His advantage , Adv Agg F is defined to be his probability of success in the following game.
-(Setup:) The aggregate forger F is provided with 1 ID , which is an identity generated at random. ID . The probability is over the coin tosses of the keygeneration algorithm and of F .
IV. THE PROPOSED ID-BASED AGGREGATE SIGNATURE SCHEME

A. IBAS Scheme
This IBAS scheme consists of six algorithms: G , K , S , V , AS and AV . The first four algorithms are as in ordinary ID-based signature schemes; the last two provide the aggregation capability. It works as follows.
-G : Given a security parameter l + ∈ Z , PKG runs the setup algorithm which outputs two groups G and G 1 of prime order q as above, two random generators P and Q of G , a bilinear map , , , , , , , params =< q P Q P e H ,H > G Gˆ.
-K : Let 1 2 , , , n P P P denote all the users to join the signing. The identity of i P is denoted as i ID . The PKG provides the user's identity i ID and the master secret key s as input to this algorithm and receives his public key e PV e P V e PV e P rQ hS 
C. Security Analysis
Here we define the IBAS security model based on Xu's model [23] . In the model, the adversary A is given a single * ID . His goal is the existential forgery of an aggregate signature. We allow an adversary A to corrupt all but one honest signer * ID . His advantage IBAS Adv A , is defined to be his probability of success in the following game.
-Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm and generates the params and master secret key s .The Challenger C gives the params to the adversary A .The adversary A is provided with * ID , which is an identity generated at random.
- ( , ) t ε -GDH group. We may assume the forger is well-behaved in the following sense: A forger A makes an Extraction query for an ID only if a 2 H query has been made before for the ID. Also Signature query is made for a message m only if a 1 H queries has been made before for the m . Algorithm C is given aP ∈ G and bP ∈ G . Its goal is to output abP ∈ G . Algorithm C simulates the challenger and interacts with forger A as follows.
Setup: Algorithm A choose a random value (2) Otherwise, algorithm C picks * q v ∈ Z at random, store the tuple ( , , , ) ID m U v in the list 1 L and returns v as a hash value to A . H 2 -Query: At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle 2 H . To respond to these queries, C maintains a list 2 L of tuples ( , , , )
ID w x y as explained below. The list is initially empty. When an identity ID is submitted to the 2 H oracle, algorithm C responds as follows:
(1) If the query ID already appears on the 2 H in some tuple ( , , , ) . This completes the description of algorithm C . To complete the proof, we shall show that C solves the given instance of CDH problem in G with probability at least ' ε . First, we analyze the four events needed for C to succeed: Pr
. Proof: The probability that algorithm C does not abort as a result of A 's key extraction queries is at least
Proof: The probability that algorithm C does not abort as a result of A 's signature queries is 1. Hence 2 1 Pr
Proof: If algorithm C does not abort as a result of A 's signature queries and key extraction queries then algorithm A 's view is identical to its view in the real attack. Hence, 3 1 2
Claim 4.
. Proof: The probability that algorithm C does not abort after A outputting a valid and nontrivial forgery is at least
. According to the above discussion, we can conclude that algorithm C produces the correct answer with probability at least Since elliptic curve additions and hash operations are far more efficient than pairing operations, the aggregate verification of our scheme is more efficient than individual verification of signatures, it only requires three pairing operations. And we can see that the aggregate signature 'length is same as the individual signature's.
We compare our scheme with other ID-based aggregate signature schemes for k signatures from computation overhead view point.
Let p C be the pairing operation, * C be the point scalar multiplication in G , C + be the point addition in G , and e C be the exponential operation in G , respectively. We summarize the results in Table I (we ignore the general hash operation).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed an ID-based aggregate signature scheme with constant pairings. Our scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen messages attacks, and the security is tightly related to Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the Random Oracle model. Our aggregate signature scheme is based on bilinear pairing. Just like all other pairing based cryptosystems, it is simple, efficient and has short signature size.
Finding an efficient aggregate signature with constant pairing computations in verification and constant size of aggregate signature without any interaction among users remains as an interesting open problem in this field, also developing an aggregate signature in the standard model is another open problem to look at. 
